Aristotle does not propound a systematic legal theory in the modern sense. While the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics contain several memorable statements on nomos, at no point in the practical works does Aristotle purport to provide a scientific account of law as an autonomous system or an analysis of the necessary truths about law that explain it.1 The absence of a systematic legal theory in Aristotle cannot, moreover, simply be attributed to the dictum that an educated person should only seek as much precision as a subject matter allows (NE I.3, 1094b24–5). That such a conclusion would be facile may be seen by a comparison with Aristotle’s treatments of justice and the constitution. These two concepts frame Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics and Book III of the Politics (if not the Politics as a whole) respectively and their explanatory value is confirmed when they are deployed to elucidate other important political phenomena such as stability and change. By contrast, Aristotle’s tendency is to deal with nomos in the context of an examination of more fundamental political concepts. Law accordingly seems to have a derivative explanatory status.