In GC II 3, Aristotle gives an initial justification of three theses: (i) that there are four primary bodies; (ii) that these are earth, air, fire, and water; and (iii) that each is associated with two primary differentiae. Despite his laconic presentation, Aristotle offers an impressive variety of justifications for his main contentions: he appeals to combinatorial mathematics, to what is “in accordance with argument,” to empirical observation, and to his predecessors. I consider whether this chapter indicates that the primary bodies are not really elements; whether the “apparent simple bodies” Aristotle mentions are the primary bodies or something else; and how to understand the “fiery” and “airy” things that are not fire and air (respectively) but somehow like them. I find that the primary bodies are indeed genuine elements of sensible bodies for Aristotle; that the “apparent simple bodies” are the everyday counterparts of the elemental bodies; and that the contrast between fiery and airy things and fire and air is a contrast between the elemental bodies and their everyday counterparts.