In the previous chapter Aristotle offered arguments against all the obvious candidates to serve as the locomotive power. He ended up contending that mind is not the locomotive power because thought without desire does not cause motion and desire dominates intellect in incontinent persons. Yet neither is desire always determinative of motion because mind overcomes it in the continent person (433a1–8). But he begins this chapter suggesting that it appears that both desire and mind move animals according to place. He states, “It is apparent to be sure that these two are movers, either desire or mind, if someone would place phantasia as some sort of intellection” (φαίνεται δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα, 433a9–10). Both desire and mind can be in play, since he says “two” (and see a13 immediately afterward), though he may use the disjunction inclusively to allow for either …or, or both together, since one or the other might cause motion or both together, and even if these always somehow work together, they often seem to be in opposition. That phantasia can be called some sort of noesis was already suggested in iii 3.427b16–17 and b27–29. If nous includes phantasia, and beasts are moved by phantasiai, then nous may have a clear role in animal motion.