In chapter 3, I argued that coercive strategies can only be effective if the coercer is willing to use force. And if force is used, it must be done effectively. Due to Western superiority in combat power, adversaries have no other choice than to use the “great equalizer” to thwart this superiority: unconventional and asymmetrical strategies of countercoercion. If this is done in a smart way, this can even nullify the West's might. In the previous chapter I concluded that the armed forces of liberal democracies could be deployed in distant parts of the world. They must not only be prepared to fight conventional wars against regular forces, but also unconventional operations against the opponents’ irregular armed forces and terrorists.

In conventional wars, armies take and hold ground, air forces conduct strategic bombing operations and support ground forces, and navies support land forces with land attack missiles by conducting offshore attacks and cutting off lines of supply. Gaining air superiority is a prerequisite for success, and air power plays a key role in paving the way for land forces.

In unconventional warfare it is only through the physical control of an area or isolation of the opponent that military objectives can be met. Special operations forces and specialized forces, such as air maneuver units, play a key role. Air superiority is no problem because the opponent is unlikely to possess aircraft, although he may have a limited number of MANPADS (man-portable air-defense systems). But the actual role of air forces is limited to close air support and interdiction. I consider unconventional warfare primarily a political struggle and a method of achieving asymmetry. At the strategic level, the opponent using asymmetrical tactics exploits the fears of the civilians, thereby undermining the government, compromising its alliances, and affecting its economy. To achieve this, the opponent uses unconventional warfare techniques at the tactical level to change the course of action in order to prevent the opponent from achieving political objectives. The tactics of unconventional warfare include guerrilla, hit-and-run attacks, sabotage, terrorism, and psychological warfare. Usually, rebels, terrorists, and criminals with small, but well-organized forces or militias will adopt these tactics.