The idea for this book emerged in 1999, during the war on Kosovo. I was struck by NATO's prediction that the humanitarian tragedy would be over within days. Anyone with a little knowledge about the history of military interventions could have known that these predictions would be proven wrong. Day after day I reported on Operation Allied Force for Dutch television. It provided me with an opportunity to test my assumptions regarding the dynamics of coercion. During Operation Enduring Freedom, the intervention in Afghanistan (2001), Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Second Gulf War (March through May 2003) I was again able to test those assumptions. Much to my surprise, I found that, almost unconsciously, I had developed a simple set of “rules” for explaining to the general public what had happened during those wars. I decided to make these rules explicit and explain them in my inaugural lecture as professor of strategic studies at Leiden University in the Netherlands. Subsequently, I decided to use my inaugural lecture as the basis for this book. The core of my thinking is still based on the coercive mechanisms as described in chapter 3.

During my television appearances, I also explained the broad context in which coercion took place. The scope of this book is just as broad. In fact, the strategist must have an extensive knowledge about the toolkit of military capabilities available. But he should also have some knowledge about the doctrine guiding the use of military force, as well as the political, cultural, and historical context in which force is used.

I would like to thank all those who gave me constructive criticism on the manuscript or otherwise contributed to this work: Colonel Charles Brantz, Dr. Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Colonel Frank van der Meijden, Dr. Wim Klinkert, Rem Korteweg, Colonel Frans Osinga, Professor dr. Jan Geert Siccama, Captain Jeroen Stad, and Julie Wagschal.

La Grande Verrière (France), October 2004