The first edition of this book was published when the lessons learned from the stabilization missions in Afghanistan and Iraq were debated and codified in new doctrinal publications. The US publication, Field Manual 3-24 – the “Petraeus manual” – was published in 2006 and was widely read by the general public. This reflected broad public interest in the issue of the use of military power in complex contingencies. The new doctrine marked a US shift from enemy-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) to populationcentric COIN.

The new doctrinal publications also introduced new concepts such as stabilization and reconstruction. Stabilization, guided by COIN, was the military part of the effort. Reconstruction was aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the population and was guided by ideas such as the Comprehensive Approach and the Whole of Government Approach.

Due to the underfunding of the missions, too few troops, the asymmetrical tactics of the opponent, numerous political caveats, the inability to cooperate effectively and misjudgment of the local dynamics of Afghanistan and Iraq, political objectives could not be achieved. As a matter of fact, failing stabilization and reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan nullified the initial success of the regime change operation. The failures of Iraq and Afghanistan confirmed the conclusion of the first edition of this book, namely that the West's military might scarcely matters.

With regard to conventional warfare, other important developments demonstrated the correctness of this conclusion. Technology allowed emerging countries and rogue states to develop anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that could nullify the superiority of Western navies and air forces. Moreover, the West was affected by the financial and economic crisis, which accelerated its relative decline. This weakened the West's shaping power and further eroded the effectiveness of its economic and military instruments.

Geopolitical changes, operational lessons learned, and conceptual and doctrinal shifts have inspired me to update the first edition of this book with new case studies, insights and conclusions.

With the support of my former PhD student and long-time staff member Rem Korteweg, I completely revised chapter 3 on coercive mechanisms to reinforce its core message that three coercive instruments define the outcome of all coercive efforts. This chapter remains the theoretical core of my thinking about the usefulness of military power.