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6 - Myanmar and Elite-Level Cohesion: A Case of Irreconcilable Dichotomies?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2015

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Summary

With the passing of time, the AIPMC's (ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus's) analysis that Myanmar would continue to affect ASEAN both regionally and internationally has proved accurate. While the chairmanship issue forced the evolution of ASEAN towards more open engagement with (and criticism of) the internal affairs of Myanmar, such developments did not result in any marked improvement in the political conditions within the country and, moreover, ASEAN's tougher stance did not succeed in shielding the Association from international pressure. As will be demonstrated, ASEAN's experiment in “enhanced interaction” further isolated ASEAN's relations with Myanmar and weakened any ascertainable “collective identity” by raising tensions between the progressive and conservative members of the ASEAN elite. As had been feared by some regional policy-makers, Myanmar increasingly turned towards other nations — such as China, India, Russia, and North Korea — for diplomatic, military, and economic support. In the process of strengthening its bilateral relationships with extraregional actors, the SPDC seemed to have paid even less regard to the interests of ASEAN. The manner by which ASEAN attempted to respond to this conundrum and the continued consequences for the Association's modus operandi form the subject of analysis below. The section that follows examines the regional and international implications of September 2007 when thousands of Buddhist monks led protests against the junta in the streets of Yangon (Rangoon) — herein referred to as the “Saffron Revolution”.

THE FRAGMENTATION OF CONSENSUS: RESPONDING THROUGH CRITICAL DISENGAGEMENT?

In the wake of the announcement that Myanmar would be abdicating its chairmanship of ASEAN, both the United States and the European Union (EU) almost immediately indicated that they expected more from both Myanmar and ASEAN, and the AIPMC renewed its call for either the suspension or expulsion of Myanmar from ASEAN. During the first ASEAN meeting with the United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (September 2005). Rice singled out Myanmar's foreign minister and criticized the continuation of political repression in the country, arguing that Myanmar was “out of step with the world”. Then, at a November 2005 APEC leaders’ summit, Rice again attacked Myanmar “as one of the worst regimes in the world” and then set her sights on ASEAN for failing to speak adequately out about and address human rights abuses in the country.

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ASEAN's Myanmar Crisis
Challenges to the Pursuit of a Security Community
, pp. 141 - 177
Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
Print publication year: 2009

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