Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-8zxtt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-11T18:18:12.109Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

4 - Resource stability and the balance of power

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 May 2010

Emerson M. S. Niou
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Peter C. Ordeshook
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
Gregory F. Rose
Affiliation:
North Texas State University
Get access

Summary

… disagreements about how benefits should be distributed permeate the relations among actors and persist because bargains are never permanently valid Furthermore, this struggle to make others adjust is played repeatedly. Apparent victory can be illusory or defeat ephemeral, for political bargaining and maneuver result not in definitive choices conferring power on some people rather than others, but in agreements that may in the future be reversed or in discord that signals a continuation of bargaining and maneuver.

Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (1984, p. 18)

This discovery of instability…points up sharply the contrast between economic activity, most of the models for which are self-equilibrating or assume some kind of “dynamic” equilibrium, and political activity, where fundamental instability seems inherent and ineradicable.

William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962, pp. 173–4)

The relevance of system stability to resource stability

Hitherto, our analysis has focused simply on the first part of the game, which concerns international actors. This focus is especially important because it deals with the fundamental issue of sovereignty and the survival of regimes, and it shows how such survival is ensured in anarchic systems. The central thesis of this volume, however, is that there are two types of instability, and we should also be concerned about the possibility that the second type - resource instability - can also upset systems and lead to conflict.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Balance of Power
Stability in International Systems
, pp. 115 - 145
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×