In previous chapters our purpose has been to remove an information deficit about what happened both in New York and in the interior during the five banking disturbances of the national banking era. We learned that in two of the five, 1884 and 1890, the New York Clearing House responded quickly and effectively to ward off the spread of banking unrest to the interior. Cash payment was not suspended, and the number of bank runs and bank failures was negligible. However, during the banking panics of 1873, 1893, and 1907 the response of the NYCH left much to be desired, and the question naturally arises: If the Clearing House had done more, could the panics have been avoided? Surprising as it might seem, few attempts have been made to answer this question. And the reason why is that too little attention has been focused on the behavior of the NYCH and too much on the structural defects of the national banking system in conjunction with the normal seasonal flows of funds at crop moving time. According to the conventional wisdom, an inelastic stock of paper currency coupled with the pyramiding of the nations' ultimate banking reserve in New York made the central money market especially vulnerable to external shocks during the time crops were being harvested and shipped to the eastern seaboard. Little or no blame has been placed on the performance of the NYCH.