DEFINITION

In everyday life, and also in science, opinions are often expressed by making categorical assertions, rather than by citing personal probabilities. The categorical assertion of H, when sincere and intentional, expresses a mental state of the assertor that I refer to as acceptance of H. This chapter will examine the concept of acceptance just defined; the following chapter will argue that it is an important concept for the philosophy of science.

What I am here calling acceptance is commonly called belief. Consider, for example, G. E. Moore's (1942, p. 543) observation that it is paradoxical to say ‘H, but I do not believe that H.’ The paradox is explained by the fact that sincere and intentional assertion of H is taken to be a sufficient condition for believing H.

It is, then, part of the folk concept of belief that it is a mental state expressed by sincere, intentional assertions. However, I think the folk concept involves other aspects too, and I am going to argue that the various aspects of the folk concept of belief do not all refer to the same thing. That is why I am calling the concept I have defined ‘acceptance’, rather than ‘belief’.

My definition of acceptance assumes that you understand what a sincere assertion is. If that is not so, we are in trouble. For I cannot define sincerity except by saying that an assertion is sincere iff it was intended to express something the assertor accepts; and you won't understand this definition unless you already understand acceptance.