This chapter examines the impact of the pro-maritime war argument upon the actual naval policy of the government during the War of the Spanish Succession, and reveals to the extent of the government attempts to implement the two major operations against Spanish America that we have seen in the previous chapter: interception of the Spanish silver fleets and colonial expeditions. Ian R. Mather, who studied activities of the Royal Navy in America and the West Indies in the period between 1660 and 1720, emphasised its defensive character and relatively modest success in territorial conquest in that period, while colonists were more enthusiastic and probably more successful in attacks on enemy territory. If we look only at the outcome of the naval operations in that region, this remark seems to be adequate. In fact, enthusiasm in expeditions for colonial conquests was not lacking in the mother country. Moreover, those who showed interest in naval operations against Spanish America were not confined to opposition politicians. N.A.M. Rodger has pointed out that, irrespective of political allegiance, all English politicians were committed to the ‘myths of English sea power’; the true distinction tended to be between those in opposition who were fully committed to it, and those in power who were obliged to make some compromises with reality. However, this does not mean that the supporters of colonial maritime war gave up their policy when they came to power.