In 1659 John Hollond wrote, ‘It hath been an old and great dispute which is the best way of victualling, whether by particular men as contractors at a certain rate, or by the State.’

Throughout the seventeenth century a fierce debate raged concerning the strategy of victualling the Royal Navy, and those in favour of a competitive private system were already clashing with supporters of state intervention. The former group argued in favour of a system that offered a certain degree of flexibility, a dynamic approach and lower costs due to a contractual system based on market demand; whereas the latter group, which included people such as John Hollond, underlined the contradiction inherent in the desire of the former to make a profit on a mission of public service. Hollond claimed that, in the same way that the presence of a worm can rot a piece of fruit, corruption would be the inevitable consequence of a victualling system awarded to merchants and wholesalers. He concluded by stating that the quest for profit making was apparent at every level and incited officers and suppliers to reach ‘agreements’, to the detriment of the public interest.

It may be argued that the Royal Navy's excellent logistical results, starting with the war of 1739–48 and culminating in the Seven Years War, were due to the success the Admiralty achieved, after a certain experimental period, in reconciling the flexibility and rigidity of the two systems outlined above into a single, original, organisation.