The general peace which lasted from 1783 to 1793 was disturbed at times by the usual crises – over the Netherlands in 1787, over Nootka Sound on the Pacific coast of North America in 1790, over Ochakov in Russia in 1791 – all of which involved Britain and were threatening enough to compel the mobilisation of the fleet, and this kept the Royal Navy alert and sufficiently strong. Only in the Nootka crisis were the West Indies directly involved, when, as part of the pressure exerted on Spain, a squadron of six line-of-battle ships was sent to the islands out of the twenty-nine assembled in Britain, and four regiments of troops also. The crisis over Holland had produced a fleet of thirty such ships, intended as a pressure on France, but Prussia was an ally of Britain in this crisis and its threats may have been more decisive. The Russian crisis of 1791 petered out when the Empress Catherine simply ignored the British threats. A large fleet of thirty-six line-of-battle ships was to be sent through the Mediterranean – the crisis was over the town of Ochakov on the Black Sea – but she knew full well that the fleet would never get through the Straits in the face of the Turkish prohibition, and if a British fleet went into the Mediterranean it could be harried by a joint Franco-Spanish force, by which it would be outnumbered.

The essential points to note, however, are that the fleet was being used regularly to assert Britain's interests in these crises, but that the threat was sufficient in two cases, while in one the Prime Minister William Pitt's bluff was called. This was a reassertion of Britain's right to be considered and consulted in all European crises as a member of the club of Great Powers. It marked a recovery from the low point of defeat reached in 1783. The second point is that the fleet was capable of being mobilised quickly enough and in sufficient strength to have an effect, at least in Europe. The Admiralty organisation was clearly strong and the ships were evidently fully available.