Book contents
- British World Policy and the Projection of Global Power, c.1830–1960
- British World Policy and the Projection of Global Power, c.1830–1960
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Notes on the Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction: British World Policy and the White Queen’s Memory
- 1 The War Trade Intelligence Department and British Economic Warfare during the First World War
- 2 The British Empire and the Meaning of ‘Minimum Force Necessary’ in Colonial Counter-Insurgencies Operations, c.1857–1967
- 3 Yokohama for the British in the Late Nineteenth Century: A Hub for Imperial Defence and a Node of Influence for Change
- 4 ‘The Diplomatic Digestive Organ’: The Foreign Office As the Nerve Centre of Foreign Policy, c.1800–1940
- 5 Financial and Commercial Networks between Great Britain and South America during the Long Nineteenth Century
- 6 Britain through Russian Eyes: 1900–1914
- 7 Imperial Germany’s Naval Challenge and the Renewal of British Power
- 8 Views of War, 1914 and 1939: Second Thoughts
- 9 The Ambassadors, 1919–1939
- 10 The Tattered Ties that Bind: The Imperial General Staff and the Dominions, 1919–1939
- 11 Seeking a Family Consensus? Anglo-Dominion Relations and the Failed Imperial Conference of 1941
- 12 Imperial Hubs and their Limitations: British Assessments of Imposing Sanctions on Japan, 1937
- Index
1 - The War Trade Intelligence Department and British Economic Warfare during the First World War
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 September 2019
- British World Policy and the Projection of Global Power, c.1830–1960
- British World Policy and the Projection of Global Power, c.1830–1960
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Notes on the Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction: British World Policy and the White Queen’s Memory
- 1 The War Trade Intelligence Department and British Economic Warfare during the First World War
- 2 The British Empire and the Meaning of ‘Minimum Force Necessary’ in Colonial Counter-Insurgencies Operations, c.1857–1967
- 3 Yokohama for the British in the Late Nineteenth Century: A Hub for Imperial Defence and a Node of Influence for Change
- 4 ‘The Diplomatic Digestive Organ’: The Foreign Office As the Nerve Centre of Foreign Policy, c.1800–1940
- 5 Financial and Commercial Networks between Great Britain and South America during the Long Nineteenth Century
- 6 Britain through Russian Eyes: 1900–1914
- 7 Imperial Germany’s Naval Challenge and the Renewal of British Power
- 8 Views of War, 1914 and 1939: Second Thoughts
- 9 The Ambassadors, 1919–1939
- 10 The Tattered Ties that Bind: The Imperial General Staff and the Dominions, 1919–1939
- 11 Seeking a Family Consensus? Anglo-Dominion Relations and the Failed Imperial Conference of 1941
- 12 Imperial Hubs and their Limitations: British Assessments of Imposing Sanctions on Japan, 1937
- Index
Summary
The best-known element of signals intelligence during the First World War is work against the operational traffic of armies and navies, centring on cryptanalysis and traffic analysis. However, overwhelmingly its largest element during that conflict, and the area where signals intelligence was most frequently used, lay in economic warfare. This instance was perhaps the case in history where communications intelligence worked best without the aid of cryptanalysis. It was the first case where both communications intelligence and powerful and sophisticated modes of analysis were applied to strategy and economic warfare. These issues were fundamental to a central part of the Great War: the blockade. Studies of the blockade routinely mention communications intelligence, but rarely treat it systematically. Thus, a key dimension in the history of the blockade, and signals intelligence, is overlooked. Between 1914 and 1918, British intelligence intercepted and read 80,000,000 telegrams, 25,000,000 radio messages and 630,000,000 postal packets, possibly involving over 1,000,000,000 letters, since business packages routinely carried many messages. These are big numbers. They dwarf any collection of communications, or intelligence, ever known before 1914. These messages were processed in real time and applied effectively to economic warfare. Without this power in collection and assessment, the blockade would have taken a different form.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019