Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- 2 Compliance as Costs and Benefits
- 3 The Professionalization of Compliance
- 4 From Responsive Regulation to Ecological Compliance: Meta-regulation and the Existential Challenge of Corporate Compliance
- 5 Behavioral Ethics as Compliance
- 6 Constructing the Content and Meaning of Law and Compliance
- 7 Compliance as Operations Management
- 8 Compliance and Contestation
- 9 Compliance as Management
- 10 Compliance as Liability Risk Management
- 11 Criminalized Compliance
- 12 Supply Chain Compliance
- 13 Regulatory Compliance in a Global Perspective: Developing Countries, Emerging Markets and the Role of International Development Institutions
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
3 - The Professionalization of Compliance
from Part I - Compliance Concepts and Approaches
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 May 2021
Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Compliance as the Interaction between Rules and Behavior
- Part I Compliance Concepts and Approaches
- 2 Compliance as Costs and Benefits
- 3 The Professionalization of Compliance
- 4 From Responsive Regulation to Ecological Compliance: Meta-regulation and the Existential Challenge of Corporate Compliance
- 5 Behavioral Ethics as Compliance
- 6 Constructing the Content and Meaning of Law and Compliance
- 7 Compliance as Operations Management
- 8 Compliance and Contestation
- 9 Compliance as Management
- 10 Compliance as Liability Risk Management
- 11 Criminalized Compliance
- 12 Supply Chain Compliance
- 13 Regulatory Compliance in a Global Perspective: Developing Countries, Emerging Markets and the Role of International Development Institutions
- Part II Deterrence and Incapacitation
- Part III Incentives
- Part IV Legitimacy and Social Norms
- Part V Capacity and Opportunity
- Part VI Compliance and Cognition
- Part VII Management and Organizational Processes
- Part VIII Measuring and Evaluating Compliance
- Part IX Analysis of Particular Fields
- References
Summary
Abstract: In the last three decades, compliance has grown from an ad hoc job function into a sophisticated profession. In this chapter, I describe the development of the field and current challenges in the design of effective compliance programs. I discuss several opportunities, particularly around the use of data and analytics, that have the potential to enhance compliance efficiency and efficacy.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Compliance , pp. 27 - 36Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
References
Chen, Hui, and Soltes, Eugene. 2018. “Why Compliance Programs Fail: And How to Fix Them.” Harvard Business Review 96 (2) (March–April): 116–25.Google Scholar
Darley, John, and Batson, Daniel. 1973. “‘From Jerusalem to Jericho’: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 27 (1): 100–8.Google Scholar
EY Fraud Investigation & Dispute Services and Anheuser-Busch InBev. 2018. “You Can’t Monitor What You Can’t Measure,” Fraud Magazine (March/April).Google Scholar
Haugh, Todd. 2017a. “The Criminalization of Compliance.” Notre Dame Law Review 92 (3): 1215–70.Google Scholar
Haugh, Todd. 2017b. “Nudging Corporate Compliance.” American Business Law Journal 54: 683–741.Google Scholar
Khanna, Vikramaditya S. 2018. “An Analysis of Internal Governance and the Role of the General Counsel in Reducing Corporate Crime.” In Research Handbook on Corporate Crime and Financial Misdealing, ed. Arlen, Jennifer. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
Laufer, William. 2018. “A Very Special Regulatory Milestone.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 20: 392–428.Google Scholar
Ostlund, Grant A. 2017. “Should We Separate the General Counsel & The Chief Compliance Officer?” Law School Student Scholarship: 889.Google Scholar
Simons, Robert. 2010. Seven Strategy Questions: A Simple Approach for Better Execution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Review Press.Google Scholar
Sokol, D. Daniel. 2017. “Troubled Waters between U.S. and European Antitrust.” Michigan Law Review 115 (6): 955–77.Google Scholar
Soltes, Eugene. 2018a. “Designing a Compliance Program at AbInBev.” Harvard Business School Case 118–071, March.Google Scholar
Soltes, Eugene. 2018b. “Evaluating the Effectiveness of Corporate Compliance Programs: Establishing a Model for Prosecutors, Courts, and Firms,” NYU Journal of Law & Business 14 (3): 965–1011.Google Scholar
Soltes, Eugene. 2019a. “Accenture’s Code of Business Ethics,” Harvard Business School Teaching Note 119–049, January.Google Scholar
Soltes, Eugene. 2019b. “Where Is Your Company Most Prone to Lapses in Integrity?” Harvard Business Review (July/August).Google Scholar
Stapp, Alec. 2019. “GDPR After One Year: Costs and Unintended Consequences,” May 24, post on blog “Truth on the Market,” https://truthonthemarket.com/2019/05/24/gdpr-after-one-year-costs-and-unintended-consequences/.Google Scholar
United States Department of Justice Criminal Division (US DOJ). 2019. “Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs.” Guidance Document, updated April 2019.Google Scholar
United States Sentencing Commission (USSC). 2014. “2014 Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual.”Google Scholar
Yoffie, David B., and Kwak, Mary. 2001. “Playing by the Rules: How Intel Avoids Antitrust Litigation.” Harvard Business Review (June).Google Scholar
- 4
- Cited by