Chapter 4 presents the argument that supporting the creation of an ICCJ is in corporations’ best economic interests. Corporations litigating cross-border mass torts incur massive direct costs such as attorneys’ and experts’ fees or injunctions such as freezing corporate assets. When litigating in the courts of developing countries, those costs are compounded by real and perceived corruption. As high as they are, direct costs can be dwarfed by indirect costs. Corporations facing large lawsuits may find that their share price falls, that raising capital becomes more expensive in the face of lenders’ uncertainty, or that they are forced to refrain from undertaking business activities such as expansion or mergers. These and other indirect costs can threaten a company’s very existence. The new industry of litigation finance means that plaintiffs with large claims are likely to find the resources to persist in seeking enforceable judgments even in the face of repeated failure. Increasingly anti-corporate legal regimes mean that plaintiffs are increasingly able to shop for a sympathetic forum. An ICCJ would lower direct costs, limit the duration and severity of indirect costs, and provide corporate defendants with ‘global legal peace’ (globally preclusive final judgments) unobtainable in the present system.