In this rapid development of the political conflict the views of the government were clear enough. The manifold views of the opposition leaders, however, were probably not clear even to themselves. Events were moving too fast for them. And not only were their ideas confused, but also, in consequence, even the rough strength of the various forces ranged against the government was—and still is—hard to assay. For there were too many separate groups in opposition, and their respective followings are too shadowy for proper analysis. It is not even easy to be sure whether or no they were a real danger; nor whether Cavour's expressions of fear and horror over the ‘party of action’ represent his conviction or were simply a pretext. We know that he was going to defeat the opposition from the Left, as in a previous critical phase of Piedmontese history he had defeated the opposition from the Right. But one must not postulate the result before tracing the process. Nor must one automatically take his own valuation of the politics of the revolutionary party. For he tended to underestimate their sense and their loyalty and readiness to compromise, as sometimes he overestimated alike their wickedness, their folly, and their internal cohesion.

If his opponents lost, it was not just because individually they lacked his great skill. They were also quite hopelessly divided among themselves. It was a fact that the strongest among them were not the dangerous extremists he imagined.