In previous chapters, the policies and positions taken by Beijing, Taipei and Washington have been discussed in detail. In this chapter, the rationale behind those “given facts” is examined to illustrate the stalemate and dilemma Beijing is faced with in cross-strait relations.

Strategy and Rationale

The key to understanding China's Taiwan policy and its future direction lies in the understanding of its perception of (1) the international situation, (2) United States/Japan intentions with regard to Taiwan, (3) the intention of Taiwan leaders (as a whole) with regard to reunification and (4) the domestic situation.

China's persistent suspicion of U.S. intentions with regard to the Taiwan issue has long been a major factor in its Taiwan policy. Even Mao Zedong, aware that Chiang Kai-shek resisted what he saw as U.S. intentions to keep Taiwan permanently from the mainland, lent him political support. Mao said in a speech to the C.C.P. leaders in 1959: “At this point, our choice in Taiwan is between Hu Shi/Chen Cheng and Chiang Kai-shek. Who is better? Faced with this choice, I think that Chiang Kai-shek is better. Chen Cheng and Hu Shi have more connections with the United States and therefore Chiang Kai-shek is better.”

Mao was more concerned about U.S. intentions than his arch political rival Chiang and backed Chiang against Chen Cheng and Hu Shi. In 1988, Deng Xiaoping expressed the same concern. He said: “So long as Taiwan has not been reunified with the mainland, the status of Taiwan, the status as part of the territory of China, remains uncertain. Nobody knows when it will be snatched away from us once again in the future”.

China has always been suspicious that the United States and Japan are against Taiwan's reunification for both geo-political and ideological reasons. This explains China's strong opposition to the “internationalization” of the Taiwan issue.

In 1979, its slogan was “placing the hope (of reunification) on the government of Taiwan”.