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Shitong Qiao

doi:10.1017/9781316810095.011

References

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 October 2017

Shitong Qiao

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Shitong Qiao: Affiliation:
The University of Hong Kong

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Type: Chapter
Information: Chinese Small Property
The Co-Evolution of Law and Social Norms
, pp. 195 - 199

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316810095.011 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2017

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References

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