Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Different Preferences
- 4 Do social preferences exist? Arrow's and Sen's impossibility theorems
- 5 The desirable decision rule: axiomatization
- 6 Rule selection based on compromise with the unanimity criterion
- 7 Paradoxes of voting
- 8 Majority tyranny
- 9 The problem of inefficient provision of public goods
- 10 Do individuals reveal their true preferences?
- Part III Identical Preferences, Different Decisional Skills
- Bibliography
- Author index
- Subject index
5 - The desirable decision rule: axiomatization
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Different Preferences
- 4 Do social preferences exist? Arrow's and Sen's impossibility theorems
- 5 The desirable decision rule: axiomatization
- 6 Rule selection based on compromise with the unanimity criterion
- 7 Paradoxes of voting
- 8 Majority tyranny
- 9 The problem of inefficient provision of public goods
- 10 Do individuals reveal their true preferences?
- Part III Identical Preferences, Different Decisional Skills
- Bibliography
- Author index
- Subject index
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- Collective Preference and Choice , pp. 60 - 75Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009