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Scott de Marchi

doi:10.1017/CBO9780511510588.008

References

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 July 2009

Scott de Marchi

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Scott de Marchi: Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina

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Information: Computational and Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences , pp. 181 - 190

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511510588.008 [Opens in a new window]

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Print publication year: 2005

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