Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- About the Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Conflict of Interest and Public Life
- Introduction
- PART I THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
- PART II CROSS-NATIONAL CASE STUDIES
- FIVE Conflict-of-Interest Legislation in the United States: Origins, Evolution, and Inter-Branch Differences
- SIX Conflict of Interest in Canada
- SEVEN Conflict of Interest in British Public Life
- EIGHT Conflict of Interest in Italy: The Case of a Media Tycoon Who Became Prime Minister (2001–2006)
- NINE Conclusion: Conflict-of-Interest Regulation in Its Institutional Context
- Bibliography
- Index
FIVE - Conflict-of-Interest Legislation in the United States: Origins, Evolution, and Inter-Branch Differences
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- About the Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Conflict of Interest and Public Life
- Introduction
- PART I THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
- PART II CROSS-NATIONAL CASE STUDIES
- FIVE Conflict-of-Interest Legislation in the United States: Origins, Evolution, and Inter-Branch Differences
- SIX Conflict of Interest in Canada
- SEVEN Conflict of Interest in British Public Life
- EIGHT Conflict of Interest in Italy: The Case of a Media Tycoon Who Became Prime Minister (2001–2006)
- NINE Conclusion: Conflict-of-Interest Regulation in Its Institutional Context
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
James Madison, Federalist No. 51In an effort to oblige the United States government to control itself, the Framers of the Constitution divided its legislative, executive, and judicial responsibilities into three distinct but inter-related branches. James Madison, the principal architect of the Constitution, viewed men as instruments of their own desires, and this Hobbesian understanding of human nature was the dominant one among participants at the Constitutional Convention. In the Framers' view, if ambitions for power remained unchecked, then public officials would expand their powers at the expense of the public good. The constitutionally mandated separation of powers and the various requirements for cooperation in national policy making among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government were written into the Constitution to minimize concentrations of power and the potential for the misuse of public office.
The Framers also added several specific provisions to limit the potential for conflicts of interest to color decision making by elected officials. One provision bars federal officials from accepting gifts, employments, or titles from foreign governments.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Conflict of Interest and Public LifeCross-National Perspectives, pp. 101 - 124Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2008