In Part One, perceptions, both conscious and unconscious, were focused on. But what are, and how can there be, unconscious perceptions? For that matter, what are conscious perceptions? The notion of consciousness, like the notion of phenomena, has been far from clear. And the two notions seem to be importantly connected. Some (Searle 1989, 1990, 1992; McGinn 1988, 1989; Nagel 1979a, 1986; Natsoulas 1989b, 1990b, among others) would claim that they are essentially connected to each other. I deny that connection – at least in the forms it is usually presented – in these chapters. Nevertheless, I do agree that casting light on consciousness also enables one to bring into yet sharper focus the results of Part One concerning phenomena.

Consciousness matters so much to us because it is intimately connected to the idea of ourselves as Lockean persons. To be a Lockean person is to be something that thinks and feels, that not only qualifies as an object of moral consideration, but is also, most especially, a thing with moral duties and obligations; a thing that is, in short, a moral agent. Such a list is not meant to define the Lockean notion of a “person,” nor to be exhaustive. Rather, I list these traits because of the widespread belief that anything possessing them must be a conscious being. However, most attempts to analyze – or even understand – this underlying consciousness have been failures.