This chapter further investigates the role of phenomena in perception, but on a broader scale. The conclusion will once again be that phenomena play a different and lesser role than might be thought.

When it comes to the role of phenomenal states in perception, there are three major possibilities: (1) Phenomenal properties are “read off” in making perceptual judgments. This view holds that perception is itself noncognitive: an experiencing of phenomenal properties. Any cognitive act is post-perceptual and derived from the perceiver's “reading off” the phenomenal properties perceived. Call this position the “‘read-off’ position.” (2) Phenomenal properties are not “read off.” They are noncognitive causes of perception, which is a cognitive state – a judgment. While phenomenal states are not themselves perceptions, nor even necessary to perception, they – at least sometimes – play an integral, causal role in perception and so cannot be completely discounted in explaining perception itself. Call this position the “causal position.” (3) Phenomenal properties are merely epiphenomena of perceptual processes. While phenomena may not be epiphenomena altogether (for instance, they may be causes of thoughts about themselves), they play no “read-off” or causal role in perception itself. Like the causal position, this view, the “epiphenomenal position,” regards perception as a cognitive state.

In its most extreme form, the “read-off” position holds that perception has both an inner component and an outer component, the inner being a representation of the outer.