In the previous chapter, I argued that apperception of token representational states is the most likely method by which we acquire propositional-attitude concepts. In this and the next chapter, I trace out ways in which apperception enables us to acquire concepts of our self, of other selves, of external objects – indeed, of all other content. This chapter concentrates on how we sort out our self from the rest of the world, i.e., come to conceive our very self, and on how we sort out other persons as also being thinking, feeling things. The approach to these problems is through an old philosophical chestnut: the problem of other minds. The previous chapter had Dennett as its target; this one, Wittgenstein, whose later works pose the greatest challenge to Scientific Cartesianism. The previous chapter had Instrumentalism as its target; this one, Externalism, a view – in its various versions – that carries the greatest threat to Scientific Cartesianism.

1. The Argument from Analogy for the existence of other minds came under attack in the middle part of this century (for example, Wittgenstein 1953; Strawson 1963; Malcolm 1963), and while the argument once spawned a sizable literature, it is seldom discussed any more. It has been thought dead, along with the Cartesian view of mind that made it seem necessary. My intention is to resuscitate the argument and to show that there is a perfectly reasonable version of it that avoids the objections and is also compatible with current theories in developmental psychology.