This chapter begins the project of showing that perceptual states – and so, almost certainly, higher-order states – are primarily cognitive, constructive, and proposition-like, and not primarily phenomenal and passive. Many contemporary philosophers would agree that phenomena are unimportant, not even needed to be considered in discussions of perception and other mental states (see Dennett 1988b, 1991b, and Fodor 1975, for instance); but other contemporary philosophers continue to defend the importance of phenomenal states (Jackson 1977; Perkins 1983; Hardin 1988; Boghossian and Velleman 1991; Peacocke 1983; Nagel 1974; Chalmers Forthcoming, just to name a few). Since phenomenal states do occur, it is hard to see how discussion of them can be abandoned altogether. Dennett (1988b, 1991b, 1991c) tries to show why it can be abandoned, but the story he tells isn't a very good one – or at least not good enough. So discussion of phenomena is both useful and necessary, especially since ground can be gained by first thinking about them, for those who find them significant are onto something of real importance. It is just something other than what they take it to be.

One reason for the reluctance to deal with phenomenal states is the difficulty in saying what they are. I will take them, at least for the first three chapters, to be mental states that have a certain kind of experiential “feel” to them. They have a certain quality to them, which is available only to the one who possesses the state.