Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Part I Reason and critique
- 1 Reason and politics in the Kantian enterprise
- 2 The public use of reason
- 3 Reason and autonomy in Grundlegung III
- 4 Action, anthropology and autonomy
- Part II Maxims and obligations
- Part III Kant's ethics and Kantian ethics
- References
- Index
1 - Reason and politics in the Kantian enterprise
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- List of abbreviations
- Part I Reason and critique
- 1 Reason and politics in the Kantian enterprise
- 2 The public use of reason
- 3 Reason and autonomy in Grundlegung III
- 4 Action, anthropology and autonomy
- Part II Maxims and obligations
- Part III Kant's ethics and Kantian ethics
- References
- Index
Summary
I start with two puzzles about Kant's account of reason. The first is well known. It is that the very idea of a critique of reason seems incoherent. How can critique be undertaken without presupposing some conception of reason? Yet if a conception of reason is presupposed, won't the aim of a critique of reason be vitiated by presupposing what is to be criticized?
The second puzzle is about the status of the Categorical Imperative. It can be put in this way. Kant claims both of the following:
1. The practical use of reason is more fundamental than its theoretical or speculative use.
2. The Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle of practical reason.
Hence he must surely also be committed to a claim that will startle many of his readers:
3. The Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle of reason.
The two puzzles are linked: If Kant is committed to (3), any vindication of reason must vindicate the Categorical Imperative.
Yet the claim that the Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle of reason is likely to meet skepticism, if not scorn. Surely, it will be said, the supreme principle or principles of reason must be certain abstract rules of inference or practical algorithms; and surely the Categorical Imperative (if it has any standing) is the supreme principle only of morality. To see whether such skepticism and scorn are well directed I shall try to trace Kant's inquiry into the authority of reason.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Constructions of ReasonExplorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy, pp. 3 - 27Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1990
- 2
- Cited by