References
Alexy, R. (2010a). The argument from injustice: A reply to legal positivism (1st paperback ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Alexy, R. (2010b). The dual nature of law. Ratio Juris, 23(2): 167–182.
Alexy, R. (2021). Law’s ideal dimension. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Atiq, E. H. (2019). Legal obligation & its limits. Law and Philosophy, 38(2): 109–147.
Atiq, E. H. (forthcoming, 2025). Law, the rule of law, and goodness-fixing kinds. In Brownlee, K., Enoch, D., & Marmor, A. (eds.), Engaging Raz: Themes in normative philosophy. Oxford University Press. https://philpapers.org/rec/ATILTR. Atiq, E. H., & Mathews, J. (2022). The uncertain foundations of public law theory. Cornell Journal of Law & Public Policy, 31: 389–450.
Barney, R. (2023). Platonic qua-predication. Analytic Philosophy, 65(4): 453–472.
Baude, W., & Sachs, S. (2019). Grounding originalism. Northwestern University Law Review, 113: 1455–1492.
Berman, M. N. (2022). Dworkin versus hart revisited: The challenge of non-lexical determination. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 42(2): 548–577.
Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the word. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brandom, R. (1994). Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Burge, T. (1979). Individualism and the mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, IV: 73–122.
Burgess, J. A. (1998). Error theories and values. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76(4): 534–552.
Chilovi, S., & Pavlakos, G. (2019). Law-determination as grounding: A common grounding framework for jurisprudence. Legal Theory, 25(1): 53–76.
Chilovi, S., & Pavlakos, G. (2022). The explanatory demands of grounding in law. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 103(4): 900–933.
Clark, S., & Rehding, A. (2006). Music theory and natural order from the renaissance to the early twentieth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Coleman, J. L. (2001). The practice of principle: In defense of a pragmatist approach to legal theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Corwin, E. S. (1928). The “higher law” background of American constitutional law. Harvard Law Review, 42(3): 365.
Crowe, J. (2019). Natural law and the nature of law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cummins, R. (1975). Functional explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 741–764.
Dancy, J. (2004). Ethics without principles. New York: Oxford University Press.
Davis, W. A. (2005). Concept individuation, possession conditions, and propositional attitudes. Noûs, 39(1): 140–166.
Donelson, R., & Hannikainen, I. R. (2020). Fuller and the folk: The inner morality of law revisited. In Lombrozo, T., Knobe, J., & Nichols, S. (eds.), Oxford studies in experimental philosophy, vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 6–28.
Dummett, M. (1993). Seas of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dworkin, R. (1967). The model of rules. The University of Chicago Law Review, 35(1): 14–46.
Dworkin, R. (1974). Hard cases. Harvard Law Review, 88: 1057.
Dworkin, R. (1986a). A matter of principle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, R. (1986b). Law’s Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, R. (1996). Freedom’s law: The moral reading of the American constitution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Dworkin, R. (2011). Justice for hedgehogs. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Ehrenberg, K. (2016). The functions of law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Enoch, D. (2011). Taking morality seriously. Oxford : Oxford University Press.
Evnine, S. J. (2016). Making objects and events: A hylomorphic theory of artifacts, actions, and organisms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ewing, B. (2017). Conventionality, disagreement, and fidelity. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 30: 97.
Fine, K. (1994). Essence and modality. Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16.
Finnis, J. (2011). Natural law and natural rights (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fish, S. (1982). Working on the chain gang: Interpretation in the law and in literary criticism. Critical Inquiry, 9(1): 201–216. https://doi.org/10.1086/448195. Foot, P. (2001). Natural goodness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fuller, L. (1978). The morality of law (Rev. ed., 15. print). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Gardner, J. (2012). Law as a leap of faith: Essays on law in general. USA: Oxford University Press.
Geach, P. (1956). Good and evil. Analysis, 17: 33–42.
Gibbard, A. (2003). Thinking how to live. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Greenberg, M. (2008). Hartian positivism and normative facts: How facts make law II. In Hershovitz, S. (ed.), Exploring law’s empire: The jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, 265–290.
Greenberg, M. (2014). The moral impact theory of law. Yale Law Journal, 123: 1288.
Grey, T. C. (1978). Origins of the unwritten constitution: Fundamental law in American revolutionary thought. Stanford Law Review, 30(5): 843.
Hamburger, P. A. (1993). Natural rights, natural law, and American constitutions. Yale Law Journal, 102(4): 907.
Hannikainen, I. R., Tobia, K. P., De Almeida, G. D. F. C. F., et al. (2021). Are there cross‐cultural legal principles? Modal reasoning uncovers procedural constraints on law. Cognitive Science, 45(8), e13024.
Hart, H. L. A. (1994). The concept of law (2nd ed.). UK: Oxford University Press.
Hedden, B., & Nebel, J. M. (2024). Multidimensional Concepts and Disparate Scale Types. Philosophical Review, 133(3): 265–308 .
Helmholz, R. H. (2015). Natural law in court: A history of legal theory in practice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hershovitz, S. (2014). The end of jurisprudence. Yale Law Journal, 1234: 882–1345.
Hershovitz, S. (2023). Law is a moral practice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hilpinen, R. (1993). Authors and artifacts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93: 155–178.
Jackson, F. (1998). From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis. UK: Oxford University Press.
Judy, T. (2008). Normativity. USA: Open Court Publishing.
Kramer, M. H. (2004). Where law and morality meet. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kramer, M. H. (2007a). Objectivity and the rule of law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kramer, M. H. (2007b). When is there not one right answer? American Journal of Jurisprudence, 53: 49–68.
Kramer, M. H. (2018). H.L.A Hart. Medford: Polity.
Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kripke, S. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridg: Harvard University Press.
Kubala, R. (2019). Literary Intentionalism. Metaphilosophy, 50(4): 503–515.
Kubala, R. (2021). Aesthetic practices and normativity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 103(2): 408–425.
Leiter, B. (1995). Legal indeterminacy. Legal Theory, 1: 481–492.
Leiter, B. (2004). The end of empire: Dworkin and jurisprudence in the 21st century. Rutgers Law Journal, 36: 165–181.
Leiter, B. (2011). The demarcation problem in jurisprudence: A new case for scepticism. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 31(4): 663–677.
Leiter, B. (2021). Legal positivism as a realist theory of law. In Spaak, T. (ed.), The Cambridge companion to legal positivism. New York: Cambridge University Press, 79–102.
Levinson, J. (1980). What a musical work is. The Journal of Philosophy, 77(1): 5–28.
Lewis, D. (1975). Languages and language. In Gunderson, K. (ed.), Language, mind, and knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 3–35.
Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: inventing right and wrong. New York: Penguin Books.
Mag Uidhir, C. (2013). Art and art-attempts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mag Uidhir, C., & Magnus, P. D. (2011). Art concept pluralism. Metaphilosophy, 42(1–2): 83–97.
Marmor, A. (2004a). The rule of law & its limits. Law & Philosophy, 23: 1.
Marmor, A. (2004b). Exclusive legal positivism. In Coleman, J., Himma, K., & Shapiro, S. (eds.), The Oxford handbook of jurisprudence and philosophy of law. New York: Oxford University Press, 104–124.
Marmor, A. (2005). Interpretation and legal theory (2nd ed.). USA: Hart.
Marmor, A. (2007). The ideal of the rule of law. In Patterson, D. (ed.), A companion to philosophy of law and legal theory. Hoboken: Blackwell Publishing, 666–674.
Marmor, A. (2011). Philosophy of law. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Marmor, A. (2013). Farewell to conceptual analysis (in jurisprudence). In Waluchow, W. J., & Sciaraffa, S. (eds.), Philosophical foundations of the nature of law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 209–229.
McGrath, S. (2014). Relax? Don’t do it! Why moral realism won’t come cheap. Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 9: 186–214.
Millikan, R. G. (1984). Language, thought, and other biological categories. USA: The MIT Press.
Moore, M. (1992). Law as a functional kind. In George, R. (ed.), Natural law theory: Contemporary essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murphy, L. (2001). The political question of the concept of law. In Coleman, J. (ed.), Hart’s postscript: Essays on the postscript to “the concept of law.” New York: Oxford University Press, 371–409.
Murphy, M. C. (2001). Natural law and practical rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murphy, M. C. (2005). Natural law theory. In Golding, M. P. & Edmundson, W. A. (eds.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of law & legal theory. UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
Murphy, M. C. (2006). Natural law in jurisprudence and politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murphy, M. C. (2012). Defect and deviance in natural law jurisprudence. In Klatt, M. (ed.), Institutionalized reason: The jurisprudence of Robert Alexy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 45–60.
Nye, H. (2021). The one-system view and Dworkin’s anti-archimedean eliminativism. Law and Philosophy, 40: 247–276.
Peacocke, C. (1992). A study of concepts. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Pettit, P. (2023). The State. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Plunkett, D. (2013). Legal positivism and the moral aim thesis. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33(3): 563–605.
Plunkett, D., & Phillips, J. (2023). Are there really any dual‐character concepts? Philosophical Perspectives, 37(1): 340–369.
Plunkett, D., & Sundell, T. (2013a). Disagreement and the semantics of normative and evaluative terms. Philosophers’ Imprint, 13(23): 1–37.
Plunkett, D., & Sundell, T. (2013b). Dworkin’s interpretivism and the pragmatics of legal disputes. Legal Theory, 19(3): 242–281.
Pollock, F. (1902). The history of the law of nature: A preliminary study. Columbia Law Review, 2(3): 131.
Postema, G. J. (2018). Time in law’s domain. Ratio Juris, 31(2): 160–182.
Postema, G. J. (2019). Bentham and the common law tradition (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Price, P. J. (1997). Natural law and birthright citizenship in Calvin’s case (1608). Yale Journal Law & Humanities, 9: 73–145.
Priel, D. (2020). Analytic jurisprudence in time. In Bustamante, T., & Decat, T. (eds.), Philosophy of law as an integral part of philosophy: Essays on the jurisprudence of Gerald J. Postema. New York: Hart, 213–241.
Rabin, G. O. (2020). Toward a theory of concept mastery: The recognition view. Erkenntnis, 85: 627–648.
Radbruch, G. (1973). Gesetzliches Unrecht und ubergesetzliches Recht. In Wolf, E., & Schneider, H. P. (eds.), Rechtsphilosophie (8th ed.). Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler.
Railton, P. (2019). We’ll see you in court! The rule of law as an explanatory and normative kind. In Plunkett, D. et al. (ed.), New essays on metaethics and jurisprudence. USA: Oxford University Press, 1–22.
Raz, J. (1979). The authority of law. New York: Oxford University Press.
Raz, J. (1985). Authority, law and morality. The Monist, 68: 295–324.
Raz, J. (1994). Ethics in the public domain: Essays in the morality of law and politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Raz, J. (1999). Practical reasons and norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raz, J. (2004). Can there be a theory of law. In Golding, M., & Edmundson, W. (eds.), Blackwell guide to philosophy of law and legal theory. UK: Blackwell, 324–342.
Raz, J. (2019). The law’s own virtue. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 39: 1–15.
Raz, J. (2002). Practical reasons and norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical dependence: Grounding and reduction. In Hale, B., & Hoffman, A. (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, logics, and epistemology, 109–136. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rudolph, R. E. (2023). Contested metalinguistic negotiation. Synthese, 202: 90.
Ryu, A. (2024). How reasons make law. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 24: 133.
Salinger, E. (2023). Expressivism and moral independence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 108(1): 136–152.
Scanlon, T. (forthcoming, 2025). Understanding good of a kind and good for in terms of reasons. In Brownlee, K., Enoch, D., & Marmor, A. (eds.), Engaging Raz. Oxford University Press.
Schroeter, L. (2012). Bootstrapping our way to samesaying. Synthese, 189: 177–197.
Shapiro, S. J. (2007). The “Hart-Dworkin” debate: A short guide for the perplexed. In Ripstein, A. (ed.), Ronald Dworkin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 22–49.
Shapiro, S. J. (2011). Legality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Simmonds, N. (2008). Law as a moral idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, D. (2015). Agreement and disagreement in law. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 28: 183.
Smith, M. (2013). A constitutivist theory of reasons: Its promise and parts. Law, Ethics, and Philosophy, 1: 9–30.
Solum, L. B. (2015). The fixation thesis: The role of historical fact in original meaning. Notre Dame Law Review, 91: 1.
Sunstein, C. R. (1996). Legal reasoning and political conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thomasson, A. (2007). Ordinary objects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thomson, J. J. (2008). Normativity. Chicago: Open Court.
Tobia, K. (2022). Experimental jurisprudence. The University of Chicago Law Review, 89(3): 735–802.
Toh, K. (2005). Hart’s expressivism and his benthamite project. Legal Theory, 11(2): 75–123.
Toh, K. (2011). Legal judgments as plural acceptance of norms. In Green, L., & Leiter, B. (eds.), Oxford studies in philosophy of law: Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 107–137.
Valentini, L. (2024). Morality and socially constructed norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vander Waerdt, P. A. (1994). Philosophical influence on Roman jurisprudence? The case of stoicism and natural law. In Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt (ANRW)/Rise and decline of the Roman world. Berlin: De Gruyter, 4851–4901.
Waldron, J. (2001). Normative (or ethical) positivism. In Coleman, J. L. (ed.), Hart’s postscript: Essays on the postscript to “the concept of law.” New York: Oxford University Press, 410–433.
Waldron, J. (2008). Positivism and legality: Hart’s equivocal response to Fuller. NYU Law Review, 83(4): 1135–1169.
Waldron, J. (2008b). The concept and the rule of law. Georgia Law Review, 43: 1–61.
Waluchow, W. (1994). Inclusive legal positivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Watson, B. (2023). How to answer Dworkin’s argument from theoretical disagreement without attributing confusion or disingenuity to legal officials. Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 36(1): 215–240.
Wright, L. (1973). Functions. The Philosophical Review, 82: 139–168.
Yale, D. E. C. (1974). Iudex in propria causa: An historical excursus. Cambridge Law Journal, 33: 80–96.
Zalta, E. (2006). Essence and modality. Mind, 115: 659–693.
