Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Criminalizing the Corporate Control Process
- 2 Deterrence in Review
- 3 Assessing the Failure of Corporate Deterrence and Criminal Justice
- 4 Corporate Deterrence and Civil Justice
- 5 Corporate Deterrence and Regulatory Justice
- 6 Cooperative Models of Corporate Compliance: Alternatives to Criminalization
- 7 Criminalization versus Cooperation: An Empirical Test
- 8 Shaping the Contours of Control
- Appendix A Study One: Questionnaire Items and Responses
- Appendix B Study One: Sample Characteristics
- Appendix C Study Two: Questionnaire Items and Responses
- Appendix D Study Two: Sample Characteristics
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Preface
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Criminalizing the Corporate Control Process
- 2 Deterrence in Review
- 3 Assessing the Failure of Corporate Deterrence and Criminal Justice
- 4 Corporate Deterrence and Civil Justice
- 5 Corporate Deterrence and Regulatory Justice
- 6 Cooperative Models of Corporate Compliance: Alternatives to Criminalization
- 7 Criminalization versus Cooperation: An Empirical Test
- 8 Shaping the Contours of Control
- Appendix A Study One: Questionnaire Items and Responses
- Appendix B Study One: Sample Characteristics
- Appendix C Study Two: Questionnaire Items and Responses
- Appendix D Study Two: Sample Characteristics
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Summary
Corporate crime control is a deceptively complex topic. In spite of the many suggestions for how it might be accomplished (many of which are based on ideological preferences), few strategies have been explored empirically or systematically. This book began as a critical examination of the deterrence doctrine as it applied to corporations and their managers. Consistent with the “get tough on crime” philosophy of the 1970s and 1980s, many politicians, corporate crime scholars, and policy mavens determined that corporate violators would be (or at least should be) particularly susceptible to greater punishment threats – especially those found in criminal law. Given the rather unimpressive evidence regarding deterrence and traditional crime, I was curious as to whether the evidence was more convincing in the white-collar crime area. Further, I was attracted by the idea that corporations, as exceptionally powerful and often oblivious societal actors, require substantial curbs on that power for the common good. Criminal law seemed like a reasonable tool to achieve that rather modest goal. Lastly, as a student of corporate crime for fifteen years, it was comforting to know that my thoughts about corporate crime control were shared by many well-respected peers. The community of scholars who study in this area, at least those who are more critically oriented, are skeptical about the good intentions of corporate officers and challenge whether the companies they head are committed to socially responsible goals.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Corporate Crime, Law, and Social Control , pp. ix - xiiPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002
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