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7 - Informal rescue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Vanessa Finch
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
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Summary

For most troubled companies, entering into formal insolvency procedures is a course of last resort only to be pursued when informal strategies have been exhausted. Informal procedures, as noted in chapter 6, will often prove more attractive than formal steps and stakeholders will hope that informality may avoid the negative consequences that are often the result of commencing an Insolvency Act process. Those consequences may include: the precipitation of contractual breaches across financing arrangements; liquidations of collateral; rating agency devaluations; shocks to market confidence; reductions in employee morale; and reputational harms to brands and directors as individuals. Informal processes are likely to offer more flexibility than statutory arrangements and they will be more amenable to the early and proactive involvement of major creditors. They also offer a less confrontational forum for ‘marketplace’ negotiations than many a formal procedure.

It is understandable, accordingly, that informal strategies of various forms are of increasing importance to companies and their advisers. Different modes of informal action are reviewed in this chapter but, before looking at particular approaches, it is worth considering the different parties that may be interested in an informal rescue and the stages of events that commonly lead up to the selection of an informal rescue strategy.

Who rescues?

When a company encounters problems it has long been the paradigm that informal rescue processes are started when its major creditor, the bank, becomes concerned and starts to take action – either by making enquiries of the directors or by taking a more hands-on approach to overseeing managerial performance.

Type
Chapter
Information
Corporate Insolvency Law
Perspectives and Principles
, pp. 294 - 326
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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  • Informal rescue
  • Vanessa Finch, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: Corporate Insolvency Law
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139175395.008
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  • Informal rescue
  • Vanessa Finch, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: Corporate Insolvency Law
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139175395.008
Available formats
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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Informal rescue
  • Vanessa Finch, London School of Economics and Political Science
  • Book: Corporate Insolvency Law
  • Online publication: 05 June 2012
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139175395.008
Available formats
×