Book contents
- Corporate Political Responsibility
- Reviews
- Corporate Political Responsibility
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Section I Foundations of Corporate Political Responsibility: Metrics for Disclosure and Good Governance
- Section II Transparency: Causes and Consequences
- Section III Accountability: Linking Corporate Social Responsibility, Employee Relations, and Corporate Political Responsibility
- Section IV Responsibility: Corporate Political Responsibility and Climate
- 9 Measuring Climate Policy Alignment
- 10 From Kyoto to Paris
- 11 Disclosure of Political Responsibility
- Section V Implementing Corporate Political Responsibility: Opportunities and Challenges
- Index
- References
10 - From Kyoto to Paris
Business and Climate Change
from Section IV - Responsibility: Corporate Political Responsibility and Climate
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 November 2023
By
Edited by
Book contents
- Corporate Political Responsibility
- Reviews
- Corporate Political Responsibility
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Section I Foundations of Corporate Political Responsibility: Metrics for Disclosure and Good Governance
- Section II Transparency: Causes and Consequences
- Section III Accountability: Linking Corporate Social Responsibility, Employee Relations, and Corporate Political Responsibility
- Section IV Responsibility: Corporate Political Responsibility and Climate
- 9 Measuring Climate Policy Alignment
- 10 From Kyoto to Paris
- 11 Disclosure of Political Responsibility
- Section V Implementing Corporate Political Responsibility: Opportunities and Challenges
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter explores the political role of business in influencing several important federal climate change policy initiatives over the last two decade. These include the Kyoto Protocol (1998), the Climate Stewardship Act (2003), the Climate Security Act (2007), the American Clean Energy and Security Act (2009), the Clean Power Plan (2015), and the Paris Climate Agreement (2015). It examines the increasing patterns of division within the business community and explains why a growing number of companies and investors have voiced support for federal policies to address the risks of global climate change. It also explores why, nonetheless, business opponent of federal regulation have been consistently so successful in preventing the enactment of comprehensive greenhouse reduction policies by the federal government. A key reason is that business opponents of regulation have more to lose than its proponents have to gain.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Corporate Political Responsibility , pp. 278 - 309Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023
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