DIFFICULTIES ABOUT STATES OF AFFAIRS IN THE TRACTATUS

The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the truth of predicative sentences, where a predicative sentence is one that is used to say that a particular has a certain property or that a number of particulars stand in a certain relation to each other. The starting point is the account of elementary sentences given in the Tractatus, which, through discussion and criticism, will be used to form the basis for a general account of the truth of predicative sentences. Despite the fact that a number of the assumptions and doctrines of the Tractatus are unacceptable, such as its form of metaphysical atomism and the isomorphism that it posits between an elementary sentence and an atomic fact, the general way in which it avoids reifying what is said by a sentence is of abiding interest. Not only do its sophistication and thoroughness recommend it as a suitable starting point, the issues raised are by no means irrelevant to contemporary discussions.

As in Russell's version of logical atomism, there is in the Tractatus no formal announcement of what truth consists in, but, as in Russell's work, the notions of truth and falsehood come in all the time. If anything, the Tractatus has more to say about truth and falsehood.