Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Abbreviations for Kant's works
- PART ONE KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY
- PART TWO COMPARATIVE ESSAYS
- 8 Aristotle and Kant on the source of value
- 9 Two distinctions in goodness
- 10 The reasons we can share: An attack on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values
- 11 Skepticism about practical reason
- 12 Two arguments against lying
- 13 Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit
- Bibliography
- Sources
- Other publications by the author
- Index
- Index of citations
13 - Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Introduction
- Abbreviations for Kant's works
- PART ONE KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY
- PART TWO COMPARATIVE ESSAYS
- 8 Aristotle and Kant on the source of value
- 9 Two distinctions in goodness
- 10 The reasons we can share: An attack on the distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral values
- 11 Skepticism about practical reason
- 12 Two arguments against lying
- 13 Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit
- Bibliography
- Sources
- Other publications by the author
- Index
- Index of citations
Summary
A person is both active and passive, both an agent and a subject of experiences. Utilitarian and Kantian moral philosophers, however, characteristically place a different emphasis on these two aspects of our nature. The utilitarian emphasizes the passive side of our nature, our capacity to be pleased or satisfied, and is concerned with what happens to us. The Kantian emphasizes our agency, and is concerned with what we do. Alternatively, we may say that the utilitarian focuses first on persons as objects of moral concern, and asks, “what should be done for them?” whereas the Kantian addresses the moral agent, who is asking, “what should I do?”
One might think that this can only be a difference of emphasis. Any acceptable moral philosophy must take both sides of our nature into account, and tell us both how people ought to be treated and what we ought to do. Yet the difference of emphasis can lead to substantive moral disagreement. Kantians believe in what are sometimes called “agent-centered” restrictions, obligations which are independent of the value of the outcomes they produce. Even when thinking of persons as objects of moral concern, the Kantian is more likely to focus on agency. The question “what should be done for them?” is answered, roughly, by “they should be given the freedom to make their own choices, and to do things for themselves.” Rawls believes that asking the agentless “what should be done for them?” leads to distortion in the utilitarian view of moral and political decision.
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- Creating the Kingdom of Ends , pp. 363 - 398Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996
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