the release of the fbi's 1998 uniform crime reports (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1999) was met with a mix of celebration and skepticism. Lawmakers and public officials were quick to credit a variety of local, state, and federal crime-control initiatives (from community policing to “three-strikes” sentencing laws) for the seventh straight annual drop in crime rates, but many journalists and citizens remained somewhat incredulous. Questions about crime-data reliability and accuracy have been raised for such locales as Washington and Philadelphia (see Fazlollah, Matza, and McCoy 1998). At the same time, the public appears to be far more persuaded by the often sensational images contained in media crime reports (e.g., the recent string of school shootings) than by the somewhat understated figures contained in the Uniform Crime Reports. An October 1998 Gallup survey of over one thousand Americans found, for example, that a slight majority of respondents still maintain that crime is on the rise, despite the compelling statistics showing otherwise (O'Driscoll 1998).

The widespread skepticism surrounding reported crime trends may also stem in part from an increased level of quantitative sophistication among nonprofessional audiences, which have grown accustomed to USA Today style statistics and graphics. Both the public and the press may have come to understand what criminologists have known for some time – that year-toyear changes in aggregate crime levels, the usual method of FBI reporting, can obfuscate more than illuminate.