Introduction

Throughout the period of austerity, projects of welfare reform already underway in many different countries gained momentum (Muehlebach, 2016; Cummins, 2018; Koch and James, 2020). Such was the scale of the reforms and cutbacks in some states that it became increasingly difficult to know what elements of welfare states remained and if their objectives had anything to do with reducing poverty and with offsetting the worst effects of inequality. At the same time as social safety nets were being disassembled, states pursued new modes of governance and regulation, which bore down on the poorest, most vulnerable sections of society (Koch and James, 2020). In the UK, the Welfare Reform Act 2012 introduced an under-occupancy penalty (the bedroom tax), which reduced the benefit paid to claimants in social housing if they were deemed to have too much living space (Gibb, 2015). It also introduced universal credit, a welfare benefit which replaced six means-tested welfare benefits and tax credits and was accompanied by increased conditionality and harsher sanctioning (WelCond Project Team, 2018; Carvalho et al, 2020; Williams, 2021).

It has been consistent in history to blame and criminalise the poor for their poverty, though the intensity with which this happens can vary (Jones and Novak, 1999; Macnicol, 2017; Pantazis, 2016). American neoliberal paternalists (Mead, 1989; Murray, 1990) and communitarians (Selbourne, 1994; Etzioni, 1997) advocated for the withdrawal of state supports for the purpose of disincentivising a culture of welfare ‘dependency’ as exemplified by the existence of the ‘underclass’ (Whelan, 2020a: 6). Yet the underclass analysis has been traced back to the writings of social commentators in the nineteenth century and to the 1834 Poor Law (Macnicol, 2017). Therefore, much of what is reported in this chapter is not necessarily new to our time but the shape the underclass logic is now taking merits attention, particularly at a time when economic inequality is so pronounced. Unemployment in many country contexts is being overwhelmingly constructed as a lifestyle problem to be addressed through a disciplinary turn in the form of activation and welfare conditionality (Wacquant, 2009a; Tyler, 2013). This coincides with politicians and media sources decrying hidden economy activity and benefit fraud as crimes which are rampant, costing states millions and in need of serious clampdown (Gantchev, 2019; Headworth, 2019).