Some assessments of the theories outlined in Chapter 2 have been offered in the preceding chapters. The present chapter will draw these together, will inquire into the interrelationships among the relevant theories, and will comment on the study's implications for policy thinking. In addition to explaining the specific findings presented in Part III, theories need to be consistent with the broader findings of the preceding chapter – that crises are frequently more dangerous than the initial conditions appear to indicate, and that explanations of their outcomes are necessarily multidimensional.

This mode of explanation is at odds with the value placed on parsimony in contemporary international relations theory but is in accordance with the practice of historical explanation and with many approaches to policy studies. Parsimonious theory is of limited relevance to the central questions of the present study: under what conditions do crises lead to war and when are they resolved peacefully? To what extent does this depend on the gravity and acuteness of the initial conflict and to what extent on crisis diplomacy? The answers, as we have seen, must take account of both long- and short-term considerations. They are likely to take the form of contingent generalisations. Guided by appropriate theories, the explanatory factors may be brought together within an economical framework, but their essential multidimensionality needs to be respected, not assumed away.