Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Note on Sources and Texts
- Introduction
- 1 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Wage War against the Church
- 2 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Accept the Peace Agreement that the Duke of Milan is Offering
- 3 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Launch a War of Aggression against Lucca
- 4 On Whether or Not the King of France Should Make Peace with the Duke of Milan
- 5 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Sign an Offensive Alliance with the King of France
- 6 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the King of the Romans or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 7 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the Emperor or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 8 On Whether the Emperor Should Be Magnanimous towards the King of France, Whom He Holds Prisoner, or Impose Severe Terms on Him
- 9 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Risk War against Him
- 10 On Whether the Pope Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Wage War against Him
- 11 On Whether the Emperor Should Make an Agreement with the Italian States or the King of France
- Name index
- Subject index
8 - On Whether the Emperor Should Be Magnanimous towards the King of France, Whom He Holds Prisoner, or Impose Severe Terms on Him
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 April 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Note on Sources and Texts
- Introduction
- 1 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Wage War against the Church
- 2 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Accept the Peace Agreement that the Duke of Milan is Offering
- 3 On Whether or Not the Florentines Should Launch a War of Aggression against Lucca
- 4 On Whether or Not the King of France Should Make Peace with the Duke of Milan
- 5 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Sign an Offensive Alliance with the King of France
- 6 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the King of the Romans or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 7 On Whether the Venetians Should Ally with the Emperor or Stick to the Alliance with the King of France
- 8 On Whether the Emperor Should Be Magnanimous towards the King of France, Whom He Holds Prisoner, or Impose Severe Terms on Him
- 9 On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Risk War against Him
- 10 On Whether the Pope Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Wage War against Him
- 11 On Whether the Emperor Should Make an Agreement with the Italian States or the King of France
- Name index
- Subject index
Summary
Despite the scepticism of the Venetian Senate (see the previous debate), the French did pass into Italy in 1523 – to no avail – and once more in the autumn of 1524. This time, Francis I himself was at the head of a powerful army. The Imperials did not have enough forces to defend Milan, devastated as it was by the plague; accordingly, they locked themselves up in several fortified places. Francis then began to lay siege to the most important of them: that is, Pavia. Despite the coalition that Charles V had managed to make in August 1523 with Henry VIII and all the most important Italian states, not to mention the alliance with the Venetians signed the month before, the Imperials received no assistance. In addition, their poor financial resources made their position even more precarious. Being concerned about their ability to sustain themselves further, upon the arrival of a contingent of Landsknechts the imperial generals decided to launch a surprise attack upon the French camp, in coordination with the troops under siege. In the early morning of 24 February 1525, Francis's army was annihilated in a two-hour battle that would change the course of history, and the King himself was wounded and captured, while a number of French noblemen who were fighting next to him were killed. Not only did this sensational result leave Italy at the mercy of Charles V, but also it pointed at a clear French inferiority vis-à-vis Spain on a European scale – an inferiority that the French kings will be able to attenuate, but not cancel, in decades of war to come.
The news of this astonishing victory reached Charles on 10 March. According to Guicciardini, his public reaction was extremely sober:
He did not consent, as was customary with others, that there should be any demonstrations of rejoicing by bells or bonfires, or in any other manner, saying that it was proper to make rejoicings for victories obtained over Infidels, and not for such as are got over Christians.
Nor did he show ‘either in his words or gestures, any sign of immoderate gladness, or of being puffed up in mind’. The debate below took place a few days later.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Debating Foreign Policy in the RenaissanceSpeeches on War and Peace by Francesco Guicciardini, pp. 103 - 112Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2017