Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- LIST OF MAPS
- MAP 1 General map of Europe: June 1914
- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
- 1 The Great War: A Review of the Explanations
- 2 European Wars: 1815–1914
- 3 Austria-Hungary
- 4 Germany
- 5 Russia
- 6 France
- 7 Great Britain
- 8 Japan; The Ottoman Empire
- 9 Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece
- 10 Italy
- 11 The United States
- 12 On the Origins of the Catastrophe
- RECOMMENDED READING
- INDEX
6 - France
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- LIST OF MAPS
- MAP 1 General map of Europe: June 1914
- ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
- 1 The Great War: A Review of the Explanations
- 2 European Wars: 1815–1914
- 3 Austria-Hungary
- 4 Germany
- 5 Russia
- 6 France
- 7 Great Britain
- 8 Japan; The Ottoman Empire
- 9 Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece
- 10 Italy
- 11 The United States
- 12 On the Origins of the Catastrophe
- RECOMMENDED READING
- INDEX
Summary
France's long-standing hostility toward, and fear of, Germany led to the Dual Alliance with Russia, and the entente cordiale with Great Britain. These provided the framework for Germany's diplomatic isolation. After 1911, as war seemed more and more likely, French financial support for a massive Russian military program scheduled to be completed in 1917 gave Germany's military leaders reason to fight sooner rather than later. In the immediate crisis of July 1914, with French support assured, Russia mobilized against Austria-Hungary and Germany, Germany declared war, and the Austro-Serbian conflict was turned into a European war.
In many respects, the French government's goal in July 1914 was to avoid making decisions. For any action taken in that highly incendiary situation could contribute to igniting a conflagration that France did not want and for which it did not wish to be responsible. Against this motive for inaction, however, were the countervailing imperatives of the Franco-Russian alliance. Crucially, France had to avoid arousing Russian fears that French support was in any sense uncertain. To treat support for Russia as a matter for decision was to imply that France had the option of abandoning its ally and, conversely, that Russia was free to abandon France. In short, France's leaders had to adhere wholeheartedly to the alliance and to act as if the nation had no options at all.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Decisions for War, 1914–1917 , pp. 112 - 129Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004