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  1. Home
  2. Books
  3. Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth
  • Cited by 33
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Online publication date:
July 2014
Print publication year:
2014
Online ISBN:
9781107415102
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415102
Subjects:
Epistemology and Metaphysics, Philosophy
Information

Book description

The correspondence theory of truth is a precise and innovative account of how the truth of a proposition depends upon that proposition's connection to a piece of reality. Joshua Rasmussen refines and defends the correspondence theory of truth, proposing new accounts of facts, propositions, and the correspondence between them. With these theories in hand, he then offers original solutions to the toughest objections facing correspondence theorists. Addressing the Problem of Funny Facts, Liar Paradoxes, and traditional epistemological questions concerning how our minds can access reality, he challenges recent objections, and defends what has traditionally been the most popular theory of truth. Written with clarity, precision, and sensitivity to a range of philosophical backgrounds, his book will appeal to advanced students and scholars seeking a deeper understanding of the relationship between truth and reality.

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Contents

Contents
References

Bibliography

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