Perception, affects and actions are discovered once again – yet in an entirely new way – in the domain of thought. This concerns mental-images. Perception-images – towards molar composition – distil from the world a privileged centre; affection-images allow unfilmable internal intensities to be expressed through this centre; and action-images fulfil the sensory-motor trajectory by allowing the character to act in and upon the world. Thus the fundamental and primary cinematic images of matter: perception → affect → action. Mental-images capture up these matter-images in thought and – in turn – return thought to matter-images. That is to say, mental-images actualise thought on-screen. This concerns descriptions of the retention and creation of perceptions, affects, and actions: images that will traverse all degrees of reactive and active consciousness. The domain of thought is thus the consummation of the movement-image; and the mental-image explicates – for Deleuze – three such moments of consummation. We begin with the dream-image, the image of thought constituting the lowest level of consciousness. Dream-images are cinematic images which capture thought as hallucinations, nightmares, dreams, imaginations; and – at their most extreme – describe the whole world as if it were a dream. The image of the dream and the world as a dream describe the two poles of the dream-image: the dream world as a product of the dreamer; and the world as if it is a dream, a perspective on the world. The former concerns the dream-image signs of composition, which Deleuze names the ‘rich’ and the ‘restrained’ (C2: 58). The latter Deleuze designates ‘movement of world’, the genetic sign of the dream-image (C2: 59). Rich dreams and restrained dreams capture varying degrees of hallucination, nightmare, dream and imagination on-screen with respect to a centre from which they emerge: the character or characters. Rich dreams are explicitly dream-like, strange; weird, disconnected, absurd; while restrained dreams may play on the ambiguity between dream world and real world. In both cases, however, the dream-image ‘is subject to the condition of attributing the dream to the dreamer, and the awareness of the dream … to the viewer’ (C2: 58).