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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 October 2023
We already know that defining expertise is not a simple thing. We also know that even if we manage to define it, it is by no means easy to identify an expert and that expertise has some natural limitations. We know that all too often we expect too much from experts in situations in which they cannot live up to our hopes. We know, too, that there is an epistemic gulf – an unbridgeable one, to all appearances – between laypeople and experts. Laypeople are always practically helpless when having to choose the most competent expert and the best expertise. Through the lens of this knowledge, we will now take a look at three visions of the lay–expert relationship popular in liberal democratic thought as described in Chapter 1. They are as follows: (1) citizens may acquire sufficient knowledge to take part in decision-making, as it is possible to translate expertise into lay language; (2) under favourable circumstances, for example, within the framework of minipublics, ordinary citizens can acquire decision-making competence through deliberation with experts; and (3) due to the inevitable incompetence of citizens, it is sufficient to divide decision-making into two domains – political (civic) and expert-led (technical). In my view, the notion of epistemic dependence destroys the foundations of each of the above statements, bringing them all down.
TRANSLATE IT AGAIN, SAM
The first victim of epistemic dependence is the claim that we can all take part in decision-making to an equal degree and with equal success. The notion of epistemic dependence tears this idea to shreds. Epistemic differences between people are a fact. We have different degrees of competence in different fields, we differ in our knowledge, ability to absorb information and inclination to be critical, and we all filter knowledge through pre-existing attitudes and beliefs. This means that even if laypeople's knowledge can be of some use in decision-making, not everyone's knowledge will be relevant to a given issue. If we can speak of a kind of knowledge shared by all citizens to a more or less similar degree, it is knowledge related to participation in culture, that is, knowledge of values, social norms and dominant practices. This might be accompanied by simplified, popular knowledge about complex technical problems.
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