The tone of this chapter is at least sober, if not pessimistic. I anticipate that over the short to medium term, most developing country democracies – labeled here, follower democracies – will continue to perform at fairly low levels of effectiveness, i.e., the capacity of these democracies to diagnose and solve pressing socioeconomic problems on the one hand, and to absorb social conflict on the other hand, will remain low. Many of these democracies will be characterized by considerable political and social conflict, including overt violence.

A central political tendency in follower democracies will be towards the emergence of two-track polities, with a democratic track in the sphere of society and politics, especially electoral politics, and a not-sodemocratic track in the state sphere, especially in the areas of economic policy making. The political society of many poor democracies is thus likely to be characterized by “too much democracy,” i.e., by a variety of political, class, and ethnic conflicts. By contrast, the state in these settings will increasingly insulate itself from social demands and conflicts and thus exhibit “not enough democracy.” Before these follower democracies become institutionalized and effective political systems, it will be necessary to bridge this gap between “too much” and “not enough” democracy. Bridging this gap, in turn, is likely to require deliberate changes that will not be easy, namely, creation of new institutions that systematically devolve political and economic power.

What is it about the structure of the state and society in developing countries that will continue to militate against ready consolidation of effective democracies?