The previous chapter established trends in public opinion in Western Europe and the United States – all affluent post-industrial societies, long-standing liberal democracies, and stable states. Instead of a tidal wave of growing political disaffection, the evidence demonstrates fluctuating support for the nation-state, its agencies, and its actors. Some enduring contrasts in public opinion persist for decades, such as those distinguishing confidence in government in Norway and Italy, Britain and France, or the Netherlands and Belgium, maintaining cultural diversity among European nations. European satisfaction with the performance of democracy fluctuates over time, gradually moving upward during the last thirty-five years. Even in the United States – where the loudest alarm bells can be heard about a supposed rising tide of political cynicism and voter anger – in fact, American support for government has both risen and fallen periodically, and public confidence varies among the major branches of the federal government. The diagnosis suggests that much of the conventional prognosis turns out to be mistaken. This diagnosis does not imply that democracy has a clean bill of health. There remains genuine cause for concern in the disparities observed between public expectations and evaluations of how democracy works in practice. The next part of the book analyzes how far size and distribution of the democratic deficit can be explained by cultural shifts among citizens, by processes of political communications, and by the actual performance of democratic governance.