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Selected Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Larry Alexander  and
Emily Sherwin
Larry Alexander
Affiliation:
University of San Diego School of Law
Emily Sherwin
Affiliation:
Cornell University Law School, New York
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Demystifying Legal Reasoning , pp. 237 - 246
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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