Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- PART ONE DETERMINISM AND DEONTIC MORALITY
- PART TWO INDETERMINISM AND DEONTIC MORALITY
- PART THREE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING DEPRIVED OF DEONTIC ANCHORS
- 9 The Significance of the Possibility of Being without Deontic Anchors
- 10 Determinism, Deontic Anchors, and Appraisability
- 11 Virtue Ethics without Metaphysical Freedom
- 12 On the Connection between Morality's Dethronement and Deontic Anchors
- 13 Concluding Remarks
- Notes
- Glossary and List of Principles
- References
- Index
10 - Determinism, Deontic Anchors, and Appraisability
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- PART ONE DETERMINISM AND DEONTIC MORALITY
- PART TWO INDETERMINISM AND DEONTIC MORALITY
- PART THREE CONSEQUENCES OF BEING DEPRIVED OF DEONTIC ANCHORS
- 9 The Significance of the Possibility of Being without Deontic Anchors
- 10 Determinism, Deontic Anchors, and Appraisability
- 11 Virtue Ethics without Metaphysical Freedom
- 12 On the Connection between Morality's Dethronement and Deontic Anchors
- 13 Concluding Remarks
- Notes
- Glossary and List of Principles
- References
- Index
Summary
Let's remind ourselves of some terminology. To be morally appraisable for an action is to be deserving either of moral praise or blame for its performance. A common view is that determinism undermines appraisability. There are, though, different routes from the postulate that determinism is true to the conclusion that no one is appraisable for anything that one does. Three deserve special mention though I shall dwell at length on only one of them.
The first begins with the premise that if determinism is true, then one lacks “genuine” (or libertarian) freedom to do otherwise. But “genuine” freedom to do otherwise, the second premise says, is necessary for appraisability. Hence, if these two premises are true, then determinism is incompatible with appraisability. As I have suggested in previous chapters, it is the second premise of this argument that many find problematic.
A second argument starts with the premise that if determinism is true, then one cannot be an “ultimate originator” of one's actions (as ultimate origination, requires, in part, freedom from control by the past, and one can have this sort of freedom only if there is some “indeterministic break” at appropriate junctures in actional pathways that culminate in action). But one is appraisable for an action, the argument continues, only if one is an ultimate originator of it. Hence, given these premises, it follows that determinism is incompatible with appraisability. Again, it is the second premise that is controversial.
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- Deontic Morality and Control , pp. 162 - 196Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002