Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-77c89778f8-9q27g Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-23T12:43:20.196Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

9 - Designing Federalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 December 2009

Mikhail Filippov
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
Peter C. Ordeshook
Affiliation:
California Institute of Technology
Olga Shvetsova
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Get access

Summary

We thought that the utmost which the discontented colonists could do was disturb authority; we never dreamt that they could of themselves supply it, knowing in general what an operose business it is to establish a government absolutely new.

Edmund Burke as cited in Beer 1993: 205

The citizens of Europe are entitled to expect two things that their governments have thus far denied them. The first is a vigorous debate, starting from first principles and with the widest possible participation, about what the future of the European Union should be. The second is an intelligible account, capable of commanding popular agreement, of the rules by which the future of the Union will be shaped. The right way to meet both needs is to discuss and then frame a written constitution for the EU.

Economist, October 28, 2000, p. 11

And as to those mortal feuds, which in certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation … proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent given by government, or from the contagion of some violent popular paroxysm, they do not fall within the ordinary rules of calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and dismemberments of empire. No form of government can always either avoid or controul them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight and precaution, and it would be idle to object to a government because it could not perform impossibilities.

Hamilton, Federalist 16
Type
Chapter
Information
Designing Federalism
A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions
, pp. 299 - 336
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×