The published overall profit-and-loss accounts do not show the extent of the profit from “aryanization,” although there is a notable (if small) spike in 1938, which reflects the additional business of that year and the income from additional commissions (see Figure 1). The state was concerned to limit private profiteering from “aryanization,” at least where nonparty members were concerned, and banks, which on ideological grounds were distrusted, were subject to especially close attention. There was no standard bank commission on “aryanization” transactions: Deutsche Bank generally obtained a figure of between one and three percent.

Nevertheless, the big commercial banks did produce some data on their profits derived from “aryanization.” In the case of Deutsche Bank, these figures were found in the balance-sheet material prepared for 1938 and subsequent years, but there is no equivalent data for the period before 1938. This material was found not in the Historical Archive of Deutsche Bank but in its Control Department, which unearthed it and revealed its existence to Professor Pohl and the Historical Institute in the wake of the controversy over “Nazi gold”: These documents were also the basis for the report on gold transactions written by Jonathan Steinberg.

Before analyzing these data, it is worth reflecting why they were produced. The special listing of “aryanization” profits clearly reflects a perception by someone that “aryanization” constituted a peculiar and unique revenue, quite distinct from the normal course of business activity.