As I argued at the beginning of this investigation, the Lacanian theory of discourse is always problematized by its remainder, a remainder that lies both inside and outside the discourse structure, a remainder that is therefore undecidable and abject. One position in each of the four discourse mathemes set out in book 17 of Lacan's Séminaire must be occupied by the a – the lack/excess, the abject leftover resisting integration into any totalized system such as that towards which the discourse theorem itself gestures. The problem of the remainder is further compounded at a meta-discursive level insofar as the very concept of discourse per se, the means by which we create the social bonds that bind us to the symbolic order, must also assume the function of the a. As we have seen, Lacanian discourse is dynamic, its terms constantly rotating from one position to the next in an attempt to provide the perpetual movement needed to maintain an illusion that the symbolic order, the Other, has a consistent and meaningful content. Discourse as such, then, is problematized not only by its own remainder – that for which it cannot fully account (that is, the a occupying one of its structural positions) – but also by its own status as that remainder, the status of discourse itself as objet a. By way of conclusion, I intend to examine the manner in which the Perlesvaus and the Queste attempt to deal with the remainder of/as their own discourse through their narrative closure or, more exactly, their inability to effect adequate closure owing to the persistence of the discursive objet a.