It has been established in the previous four chapters that James was firmly committed to each of the following propositions:

1. We are always morally obligated to act so as to maximize desiresatisfaction over the other options available to us;

and

2′. Belief is a free action.

These propositions serve as the premises of a valid syllogistic argument for

3. We are always morally obligated to believe in a way that maximizes desire-satisfaction over the other belief options available to us.

Propositions 1–3 constitute master syllogism that underlies James's Promethean pragmatism.

James's ethical account of belief-acceptance on the basis of 3 can be extended to truth. He defines truth as “what we ought to believe” and then asks rhetorically, “Ought we ever not to believe what it is better for us to believe?” (P 42). When this implicit claim that

4. The true is what we ought to believe.

is conjoined with 3 it makes for another valid syllogism, whose conclusion is:

5. A proposition is true when believing it maximizes desire-satisfaction.

This could be called James's “truth syllogism.”

Another way of deriving 5 from 3 is to conjoin James's slogan that

6. “The reasons why we call things true is the reason why they are true.” (P 37)

with his claim that

7. The reasons why we call something true is that our belief in it has proven satisfactory.

Given that, for James,

8. Being satisfactory is maximizing desire-satisfaction.

It follows again that

5. A proposition is true when believing it maximizes desire-satisfaction.