Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of boxes
- Acknowledgments
- List of acronyms
- 1 The creation and expansion of international courts
- 2 Major legal traditions of the world
- 3 A rational legal design theory of international adjudication
- 4 Domestic legal traditions and the creation of the International Criminal Court
- 5 Domestic legal traditions and state support for the World Court
- 6 The rational design of state commitments to international courts
- 7 The consequences of support for international courts
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
8 - Conclusion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 April 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of figures
- List of tables
- List of boxes
- Acknowledgments
- List of acronyms
- 1 The creation and expansion of international courts
- 2 Major legal traditions of the world
- 3 A rational legal design theory of international adjudication
- 4 Domestic legal traditions and the creation of the International Criminal Court
- 5 Domestic legal traditions and state support for the World Court
- 6 The rational design of state commitments to international courts
- 7 The consequences of support for international courts
- 8 Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
In his book How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory, Andrew T. Guzman writes:
The study of international law is undergoing a transformation from a discipline focused on practice and doctrine into one putting greater emphasis on theory and social science methodology. International law scholars are rapidly adopting more sophisticated analytical techniques and applying these tools to study how states use law to promote cooperation in our anarchic international system.
(Guzman 2008, 211)
The goal of this book is to contribute to both aspects of this transformation – theory and social science methodology. We develop a rational legal design theory of international adjudication, which attempts to explain an important part of cooperation in the international system: the creation and expansion of international courts. In particular, we ask why states create new international courts and why states join pre-existing international courts. We argue that an interesting intersection of domestic and international law occurs when international courts are formed. After accepting a basic premise that states can benefit from bargaining with the potential assistance of an adjudicator, we contend that not all adjudicators are created equal. Different courts are created to suit the interests of a particular group of states. States have incentives to create international courts in their own legal image to reduce uncertainty in future bargaining situations. Thus, the initial negotiators of new courts, who we call the “originators,” design institutions in ways that are optimal from both a political and legal standpoint.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Domestic Law Goes GlobalLegal Traditions and International Courts, pp. 223 - 237Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011